Abstract: We consider a congestion game with two types of agents to describe the traffic flow on a road at various time intervals in each day. The first type of agents (cars) maximize a utility which is determined by a sum of a penalty for using the road at a time other than their preferred time interval, the average velocity of the traffic flow, and the congestion tax. The second type of agents (trucks or heavy-duty vehicles) can benefit from using the road together with other second-type agents. This is because the trucks can form platoons to save fuel through reducing the air drag force. We study a Nash equilibrium of this game to study the interaction between the traffic flow and the platooning incentives. We prove that the introduced congestion game does not admit a potential function unless we devise an appropriate congestion taxing policy. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategic Nash equilibrium of this congestion game. Lastly, we demonstrate the developed results on a numerical example using data from a highway segment in Stockholm.
INTRODUCTION
Transportation of people and products is widely known to be a considerable source of air pollution (Mitra and Mazumdar, 2007; Fuglestvedt et al., 2008) . For instance, a recent study (Fuglestvedt et al., 2008) shows that the transportation has contributed to approximately 15% of the total man-made carbon-dioxide since preindustrial era and also suggests that it will be responsible for roughly 16% of the carbon-emission over the next century. To overcome these problems, there have been many studies focused on proposing more efficient transportation methods. For instance, an experimental study (Alam et al., 2010) reports that two identical trucks can achieve 4.7%-7.7% reduction in the fuel consumption (depending on the distance between them) when platooning at 70 km/h. The phenomenon is primarily due to reduced air drag force when forming platoons. Therefore, in future, when most of the trucks are equipped with platooning devices, we can achieve a much higher fuel efficiency. However, there are many practical obstacles for platooning. For instance, a centralized decision-maker to coordinate the trucks would be very complex (and hence, difficult to implement in a large-scale setup). Additionally, the trucks are not on the road at the same time because they are owned by different strategic entities that are trying maximizing their profits or prefer not to share their costumers' private information. This motivates the use of a game theoretic framework for studying the traffic flow and its implications on the trucks' decision to use the road at the same time for increasing the possibility of forming platoons. In this paper, we use an atomic congestion game with two types of agents to model the traffic flow on a road at certain time intervals. The term atomic is used here to emphasize the fact that we do not work with a continuum
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of players or fractional flows when modeling the traffic flow (Schmeidler, 1973) . The utility of the first type of agents, which would not benefit significantly from moving together (e.g., ordinary cars and trucks without platooning equipment), is modeled by a sum of a penalty for deviating from the time interval on which they prefer to use the road, the average velocity of the traffic flow at that time, and the congestion tax. In addition to these terms, the second type of agents (e.g., trucks or other heavy-duty vehicles with platooning equipment) benefit from using the road at the same time as their peers. Note that this platooning incentive is indeed proportional to the average velocity of the traffic flow since these agents cannot benefit much at low velocities (Alam et al., 2010) . We show that this congestion game is a potential game under appropriate congestion taxes for the first type of agents or platooning subsidies for the second type of agents. This would guarantee that the congestion game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Then, we use joint strategy fictitious play (Marden et al., 2009 ) and average strategy fictitious play (Xiao et al., 2013) to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. To prove the convergence of the average strategy fictitious play, we adapt parts of the proofs presented in (Xiao et al., 2013 ). There have been many studies in traffic flow analysis and network routing using congestion games (Xiao et al., 2013; Levinson, 2005; Christodoulou and Koutsoupias, 2005; Correa et al., 2005; Rosenthal, 1973b,a) . The authors in (Xiao et al., 2013) proposed a model that inspired the congestion game that we are considering in this paper. However, we study a congestion game, where a group of agents would benefit from using the road at the same time as each other, to study the interaction between the traffic flow and the platooning incentives. This platooning congestion game was considered from a practical perspective in (Farokhi and Johansson, 2013) , to motivate the modeling assumptions and to extract appropriate simulation parameters using real traffic data. In this paper, we follow a theoretical approach to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and to prove the convergence of the learning algorithms. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the described congestion game with two types of agents to model the traffic flow. We present conditions for the existence of a potential function for the introduced congestion game in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the joint strategy fictitious play and the average strategy fictitious play to learn a Nash equilibrium of the congestion game. Finally, we illustrate the developed results on a numerical example in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Notation
Let R, Z, and N denote the sets of real, integer, natural numbers, respectively. Furthermore, let N 0 = N ∪ {0}. We define N = {1, . . . , N } for any N ∈ N. All the other sets are denoted by calligraphic letters such as R. We use |R| to denote the cardinality of R. Finally, we define the characteristic function 1 x=y (1 x≥y ) to be equal one whenever x = y (x ≥ y) holds true and zero otherwise.
PROBLEM SETUP
Consider an atomic congestion game composed of two type of agents, where each agent must choose from a finite action set R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r R } for some R ∈ N. In this set, entries r i , i ∈ R , denote non-overlapping time intervals of the day that a vehicle can choose to use a road. Let
denote the actions of the agents of the first type and the second type, respectively. In the rest of the paper, for the sake of brevity, we name the agents of the first type cars and the agents of the second type trucks. Car i ∈ N maximizes its utility described by
Using this penalty function, car i can arrive earlier without incurring any additional cost but it gets penalized for using the road at a later time. For the simulation results in Section 5, we use the first mapping for all the vehicles. Similarly, truck j ∈ M maximizes its utility
where p t j (z, x) denotes a potential congestion taxing policy for using road at interval x j , ξ t j (x j , T t j ) determines the penalty for using the road at an interval other its preferred one, and βv xj (z, x)g(m xj (x)) characterizes the benefit for traveling at the same time as the other trucks. Let g : M → R be a non-decreasing mapping and m r (x) = M =1 1 {x =r} denote the number of trucks on interval r. This extra term can be motivated by the fact that whenever there are several trucks on the road at the same time interval, they can potentially form platoons to save fuel. Note that this term is a function of the average velocity of the flow as trucks cannot save a significant amount of fuel when platooning at low velocities (Alam et al., 2010) . Hence, although the trucks prefer to travel at the same time, they also want to avoid the congested time intervals. The function g : M → R describes the dependency of the fuel saving to the number of trucks at a given time interval. In the rest of this paper, we assume that this function is identity; i.e., g(m xj (x)) = m xj (x). Another example for this function could be g(m xj (x)) = m xj (x)1 mx j (x)≥τ , which shows that the trucks do not benefit from traveling at the same time unless they reach a critical number τ . Now, we are ready to define a congestion game with two types of players using normal-form representation of strategic games; see (Gibbons, 1992) .
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a car-truck congestion game is a pair (z,
To prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium or to use various learning algorithms for finding an equilibrium, we focus on a subclass of games, namely, potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . A cartruck congestion game is a potential game with potential function Φ :
With these definitions in hand, we are ready to present the results of the paper.
EXISTENCE OF POTENTIAL FUNCTION
Atomic congestion games with one type of agents (corresponding to the case where M = 0 or N = 0) are known to admit a potential functions even without imposing congestion taxes (Xiao et al., 2013; Roughgarden, 2007) . In this section, however, we show that this property does not hold for car-truck congestion games unless we devise an appropriate taxing scheme.
Necessary Conditions
Let Φ : R N × R M → R be a given mapping. We can define
where x = (x j , x −j ) and z = (z i , z −i ). Using simple algebra, we can show that the operators commute, i.e.,
Now, we are ready to prove the following useful result. Proposition 1. A car-truck congestion game admits a potential function only if
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M .
Proof: Let Φ(x, z) be a potential function for the congestion game. Then, it must satisfy
Let x = (x j , x −j ) and z = (z i , z −i ). Again, when noting that Φ(x, z) is a potential function, we get
Substituting (4) into (3) results in
where the last equality follows from the definition of the potential function. Therefore, the identity in the statement of the proposition follows.
This proposition shows that it might not be possible to find a potential functions for car-truck congestion games.
A car-truck congestion game admits a potential function only if β = 0. Proof: First, we prove the identity in (5) by simple algebraic manipulations. Similarly, we can show that
Therefore, following Proposition 1, the car-truck congestion game admits a potential function only if
for all x, z and x j , z i . This is only possible if β = 0.
Potential games have many desirable attributes. For instance, these games always admit at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, many learning algorithms, such as, joint strategy fictitious play, are known to converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for potential games. Given these important properties, a natural question that comes to mind is that whether it is possible to guarantee the existence of a potential function by imposing appropriate congestion taxes. We answer this question in the next subsection.
Imposing Congestion Taxes
In this subsection, we propose a taxing and a subsidy policy that guarantee the existence of a potential function. Theorem 3. Let each car i ∈ N pay the congestion tax
for using the road at time interval z i . Then, the car-truck congestion game is a potential game with the potential function
Furthermore, this game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See (Farokhi and Johansson, 2013) .
Remark 1. Note the tax p c i (z, x) grows quadratically with the number of the trucks that are using the road at that time interval if the mapping g : M → R is a linear function. Therefore, the congestion tax policy p c i (z, x) in Theorem 3 forces the cars to avoid the time intervals that the trucks use to travel together. Instead of taxing the cars, we can also introduce a platooning subsidy for the trucks to get a potential game. Theorem 4. Let each truck j ∈ M receive the subsidy p
for a given v 0 ∈ R. Then, the car-truck congestion game is a potential game with the potential function
Furthermore, this game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Proof: Let us start with trucks. Note that with the introduced tax policy, the utility of truck j is equal
). Let us define x = (x j , x −j ). If x j = x j , the result trivially holds. Therefore, without loss of generality, we consider the case where x j = x j . In what follows, we examine each term in the cost function separately. First, we define
nr(x,z) k=1 (ak + b). For this term, we can show that
where the second equality holds because of the fact that n r (x, z) = n r (x , z) for all r = x j , x j . Noticing that n xj (x , z) = n xj (x, z) − 1 and n x j (x, z) = n x j (x , z) − 1, we know that
Finally, we define Ψ 3 (x, z) = R r=1
In this case, we can show that
Therefore, we get
The proof for cars follows the same line of reasoning.
Remark 2. Note that if v 0 is greater than the average velocity of the flow, the trucks get paid to use the road at Algorithm 1 Joint strategy fictitious play for learning a Nash equilibrium.
Input: p ∈ (0, 1) Output: (x * , z * ) 1: for t = 0, 2, . . . do 2:
Calculate z i ∈ arg max r∈RÛi (r; t − 1) 4:
With probability 1 − p,
end if 9:
for j = 1, . . . , M do 10:
Calculate x j ∈ arg max r∈RVj (r; t − 1) 11:
end if 16: end for 17: end for 18: end for the same time as their peers. This way the government incentivizes the trucks to form platoons. This subsidy is technically the difference of the fuel that the trucks would have saved if they formed a platoon at the velocity v 0 instead of the actual average velocity of the traffic flow an r (z, x) + b. Therefore, the trucks would benefit from traveling together even at low velocities (which is a scenario where the trucks do not increase their fuel efficiency significantly through platooning). However, if v 0 is smaller than the average velocity of the flow, we reduce the extra utility that the trucks would receive from traveling together (and technically p t j (x, z) becomes a tax rather than a subsidy). Therefore, it becomes less likely for the trucks to stick together. To emphasize the fact that we are willing to pay the trucks rather than taxing them (and hence, dealing with the first scenario), we call p t j (x, z) a subsidy.
LEARNING A NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the convergence of two learning algorithms, namely, joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play, when used in car-truck congestion games.
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
We start by briefly introducing the learning algorithm and, then, analyze its convergence.
Learning Algorithm
Assume that the agents follow the joint strategy fictitious play algorithm (Marden et al., 2009) . To do so, the agents must calculate the empirical average of their utility given the history of the decisions. Specifically, at each time step t ∈ N 0 , car i ∈ N should calculateÛ i (r; t) using the recursive update laŵ
, ∀r ∈ R. In (8), z −i (t) and x(t) are the actions chosen by all the agents except car i at time step t. Furthermore, the forgetting factor λ t ∈ (0, 1] shows the extent with which the agents forget the past in their decision making. In limiting cases, when λ t = 1, the agents are myopic (and only remember the previous time steps) but, when λ t = 1/t, the agents value the entire history of actions equally. Similarly, at each time step t ∈ N 0 , truck j ∈ M calculatesV j (r; t) using the recursive update laŵ
in whichV j (r; −1) = ξ t j (r, T t j ), ∀r ∈ R. Now, by following Algorithm 1, one would expect to extract a Nash equilibrium.
Convergence Analysis
Noting that with appropriate taxes the car-truck congestion game is a potential game, we can use the result of (Marden et al., 2009 ) to conclude the convergence of the learning algorithm. Theorem 5. Let the action profile of the agents be generated by the joint strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 1. Assume that λ t = λ ∈ (0, 1) or λ t = 1/t for all t ∈ N. Then, this action profile almost surely converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the car-truck congestion game, if either the cars pay the congestion tax p c i (z, x) in (6) or the trucks receive the platooning subsidy p t j (x, z) in (7). Proof: The proof is a consequence of combining Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 in (Marden et al., 2009) with Theorems 3 and 4.
Note that the joint strategy fictitious play might be restrictive in some aspects. For instance, all the agents must have access to all the individual decisions taken by the other agents to calculate their average cost function. In the next section, we adapt the average strategy fictitious play introduced in (Xiao et al., 2013) as an alternative. This learning algorithm requires a central node to broadcast the congestion prediction (i.e., an average of all the players actions) for all time intervals per day.
Average Strategy Fictitious Play
We introduce the average strategy fictitious play and study its convergence by extending parts of the proofs in (Xiao et al., 2013) .
Learning Algorithm
Before introducing the learning algorithm, we have to make the following standing assumption: Assumption 1. The congestion tax policies satisfy
is only a function of n xj (x, z), m xj (x). This assumption means that the congestion tax can only be a function of the traffic flow rather than the individual actions of the agents. The congestion taxing policy that we introduced in the previous section satisfies this assumption. To emphasize this fact, from now on, we write 
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
Let us start by considering the joint strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 1 with parameters β = 10 −3 , p = 0.4, and λ t = 3 × 10 −2 for all t ∈ N 0 . Figure 2 shows the number of vehicles in each interval versus the iteration number. Considering the fact that there are |R| N +M 10 9100 various action combinations 4 in this example, the learning algorithm converges to a pure Nash equilibrium relatively fast in terms of the number of the iterations. Figure 3 shows the number of trucks in each interval as a function of 4 To put this number into perspective, recall that there are only around 10 80 atoms in the visible universe. the iteration number. As we can clearly see, at the learned equilibrium, thirty trucks use the same time interval to commute together. Figure 4 shows the number of the vehicles and the corresponding average velocity in each time interval. The blue color illustrates the case where the drivers do not consider the congestion in their decision making; i.e., z i = T c i for all i ∈ N and x j = T t j for all j ∈ M . The red color denotes the case where the drivers implement the learned pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Evidently, the proposed congestion game increases the worse-case average velocity of the traffic flow by 12%.
Number of Trucks

Effect of the Fuel-Saving Coefficient
Here, we demonstrate the effect of the fuel-saving coefficient β on the behavior of trucks. We perform all the simulations using the joint strategy fictitious play with p = 0.4 and λ t = 3×10 −2 for all t ∈ N 0 . Figure 5 illustrates the number of trucks in each time interval at the learned equilibrium for various choices of β. As we expect, when β = 0, the trucks are reluctant to commute at the same interval. However, as we increase the coefficient β, a higher number of trucks stick together. For β = 4 × 10 −3 , all hundred trucks commute during one time interval.
Robustness of the Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
Let us consider a scenario in which at iteration t = 50, an unexpected problem, like an accident, drastically decreases the average velocity during 7:15am-8:00am. To model this phenomenon, we assume that at t = 50, the average velocity is given by (an r (x(t), z(t)) + b)/10 at r = 2, 3, 4. Figure 6 shows the number of the vehicles in each interval versus the iteration number. Note that the number of the vehicles that use r = 2, 3, 4 suddenly decreases after the disruption for a short while but the learning algorithm recovers fairly fast. . nr(x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, versus the iteration number for β = 10 −3 and v 0 = 85 when using the average strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 2.
Average Strategy Fictitious Play
In this subsection, we use the average strategy fictitious play in Algorithm 2 with β = 10 −3 , λ = 3 × 10 −2 , and p = 0.4. We also implement the platooning subsidy in (7) with v 0 = 85. Figure 7 illustrates n r (x(t), z(t)), r ∈ R, versus the iteration number. The proposed algorithm clearly converges to a Nash equilibrium relatively fast.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced an atomic congestion game with two types of agents to model the traffic flow on a road at certain time intervals. The first type of agents (cars) optimized its utility that was composed of a penalty for deviating from its preferred time interval, the average velocity of the traffic at the time of using the road, and the congestion tax (or subsidy). However, in addition to the aforementioned terms, the utility of the second type of agents (trucks) contained a term for modeling the potential platooning incentives (because of using the road at the same time as their peers). We showed that the introduced congestion game cannot be potential game unless we devise an appropriate congestion taxing policy. We used joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the introduced congestion game. Finally, we illustrated the results on a numerical example. As a future work, we can study the price of anarchy (or the price of stability) to study the inefficiency of the acquired pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
